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market growth: An empirical analysis (1995-2014).
Abstract: Over the past two decades, Chinas stock market has experienced rapid growth. This 
period has seen the transplantation of many OECD principles of corporate governance into the 
Chinese corporate regulatory framework. These regulations are dominated by shareholder values. 
This article attempts to explore whether there is a causal relationship between the changes in 
Chinas corporate governance and financial market growth, using data from 1995-2014 to create 
a robust corporate index by looking at 52 variables and a financial index out of five financial 
market parameters. Subsequently, data is subject to a panel regression analysis, with the financial 
market index as the outcome variable, corporate governance index explanatory variable and a 
variety of economics, social and technological control variables, concluding that changes in 
corporate regulation have in fact had no statistically significant impact on Chinas financial 
market growth, which must therefore be attributed to other factors.
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I. Introduction
Corporate governance as a band aid to financial malaise has been in vogue for several decades. 
Repeated accounting frauds and related corporate and financial crises in early 1990s Europe 
gave rise to the modern-day avatar of corporate governance, gradually morphing into a shorthand 
tool to justify exporting good corporate values to developing countries, in order to stimulate 
financial market growth. Transitioning to established international models relating to unified 
corporate governance practices is, according to the World Bank and OECD,  one important 
element in strengthening the foundation for individual countries long-term economic 
performance as well as a strengthened international financial system.1 Corporate governance 
within these institutions ascribe principles based on microeconomics focusing on  internal 
relationships of companies which subsequently attribute to a strengthened national and, 
therefore, international financial system2.  This economic rationale was similarly reflected by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Developments view that improvements to corporate 
governance would facilitate investment flows and mobilize financial resources for economic 
development.3 Expediency and an awareness of transparency, accountability and responsibility 
is, according to OECD, paramount when executing corporate governance to achieve the desired 
aforementioned result.4  
China is quite unique amongst the developing and mid-income countries in that it adopted 
current corporate governance practices after significant foreign investment had already taken 
place, either directly, or by proxy through Hong Kong5. China started to adopt the laws and 
regulation relating to internationally approved corporate gover ance at the turn of the 21st 
century. The dominant corporate governance code at this time was the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, based primarily on the shareholder value corporate governance model, 
although it also provided limited space for stakeholder models.6 As a result, a shareholder value 
1 The World Bank , Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation (2000) United States: Washington 
D.C. p.25, Clause 1.1.The 1999 Memorandum of Understanding between the World Bank and OECD, establishing 
the framework for the Latin American Roundtable among a series of Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables.
2 ibid, p.11.
3 UNCTAD, Guidance on good practices in corporate governance disclosure UNCTAD/ITE/TEB/2006/3.
4 The World Bank, n.1. pp. 12, 25.
5 The World Bank, n.1. p.2.
6 The World Bank, n.1. p.11; G20/OECD. G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. (2015) OECD: 
Secretary General of the OECD.
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oriented corporate governance code was adopted by the Chinese regulator with the influence of 
that approach extending to company7 and securities legislation. 
Over the past three decades, thanks to the burgeoning law and finance literature8, an assumption 
has been widely accepted by corporate scholars and international development agencies alike 
that, once a country adopts a shareholder primacy corporate governance model, benefits will be 
derived therefrom through encouraging domestic and overseas investment leading to a booming 
capital market.9 Chinas stock market has experienced remarkable growth since it was 
established in 1990.10 By October 2017, Chinas stock market had over 3500 listed firms with 
market capitalization reaching $8.5 trillion, with a global ranking second only to the USA. China 
therefore presents an interesting case study to test the postulated link between shareholder-
oriented corporate governance and financial market growth and this constitutes the main focus of 
this paper. 
This paper is structured as follows: part II details the methodology adopted in this research; part 
III focuses upon the historical background of Chinese stock market  its sui generis nature 
helping to contextualise the quantitative analysis of the financial market growth in part IV. Part 
V addresses the evolution of the corporate governance regime in China followed by a 
quantitative analysis in part VI. In part VII we quantitatively contrast and analyse the impact of 
7 Although under Chinese company law public companies are required to establish a supervisory board but in 
realtiy, the role of supervisory board is negligible and therefore, despite its two-tier board corporate form, it is much 
closer to the Anglo-American one-tier board structure. For the role of supervisory board, see J Dahya,Y  
Karbhari &J Xia, The Supervisory Board in Chinese Listed Companies: Problems, Causes, Consequences and 
RemediesAsia Pacific Business Review 9 (2002) 2. 118-137; P Wang,The The Effectiveness and Independence of 
Supervisory Board: Evidence from China 2000-2009, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2223990; Dahya, J., Karbhari, Y., Xiao, J.Z. and Yang,M. 
2003. The usefulness of the supervisory board report in China. Corporate Governance, Vol.11, 308-321.
8 Law and Finance literature is led by La Porta, et.al. in 1997 and inspired tens of thousands following-up studies 
ever since. See La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997) 52 (3) Journal of Finance 1131-
1150; La Porta et al., Law and Finance (1998) Journal of Political Economy 1113-1155; La Porta et al., Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance (2000) Journal of Financial Economics 58 (1-2):3-27 J. Fin. Econ. 3; La 
Porta et al., Do institutions cause growth? (2005) Journal of Economic Growth 271; La Porta et al., What Works 
in Securities Laws (2006) Journal of Finance 1-32; La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins 
(2008) 46 (2) Journal of Economic Literature 285-332.
9 La Porta et al (1999) Corporate ownership around the world, 54(2) (1999) Journal of Finance: 471517.
G S Liu and P Sun, Identifying ultimate controlling shareholders in Chinese public corporations: An empirical 
survey In D Brown and A MacBean, Challenges for Chinas Development: An Enterprise Perspective 2005 UK: 
Routeledge p.48.
10 N Rajagopalan, Y Zhang, Corporate governance reforms in China and India: Challenges and Opportunities 51 
(2008) Business Horizons 55-64. 
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changes in corporate governance to financial market growth in China. Thereafter qualitative 
analysis of the residual causes is provided in part VIII. Part IX concludes this paper. 
II. Methodology
The research is conducted in several stages. First, a database is created on the evolution of 
corporate governance in China from 1995-2014. The aim of this phase is to: collect data on fifty-
two separate companies; variables based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and 
previous indices for twenty years (1995-2014). These variables are scaled polynomially  for 
example the value could be zero, or one, or two meaning the survey went beyond a simple yes/no 
response in order to take into account systems which use optional rules or soft law. 
Secondly, a graded response model is used with a Kalman filter to create a dynamic corporate 
governance index for China. Applying a linear quadratic estimation creates a dynamic index 
which measures distribution of changes identified over a period of time rather than confining 
measurements to a restrictive time restraint of just one year. It is widely acknowledged that 
change in laws and regulations take some time to show their impact, hence considering 
development of corporate governance over a number of years would yield more realistic results. 
Accordingly, any incremental changes can be readily discerned by gathering data over blocks of 
time (five years) in comparison to a twelve month period. In our corporate governance survey 
several questions were asked: Is the regulation the same in 1994 in comparison to 1999?; Is the 
regulation the same in 1999 in comparison to 2004?; same between 2004 and 2009; and same 
between 2009 to 201411. These questions provide a platform for effective use of Kalman filter 
whilst also assisting the identification of seismic events that influenced change. 
Bayesian factor analysis is also used. This is the quantification of evidence for a thesis in 
comparison to an alternative/opposing thesis. Bayesian analysis is thus used to build up a 
separate multiyear index of financial market growth consisting of five variables - foreign direct 
investment (FDI); market capitalisation of listed companies; S&P global equity index; volume of 
stocks traded and the number of listed domestic companies to represent the financial growth of 
countries; and three control indices of similar timescales comprising a total of ten variables. 
11 With thanks to Xun Zhang for assistance with the survey.
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Those being: annual percentage growth rate of GDP; purchasing power parity conversion factor; 
current account balance; real interest rate; external debt stocks; commercial bank branches per 
head of population; mobile cellular telephone subscriptions per head of population; electric 
power consumption per capita; high-technology (products with high R&D intensity) exports in 
current USD; and the number of patent and trademark applications filed at USPTO.12 
Subsequently, Bayesian change point analysis is used to identify the breakpoints, for example: 
the time period or particular year when there was a regime shift (a substantial movement away 
from the previous distribution or, qualitatively speaking, a complete change from the previous 
system). In the corporate governance development index a breakpoint signifies a complete 
change from the previous system usually in the form of a completely new corporate governance 
code that replaces the previous system. In the financial market development index, a breakpoint 
signifies either a market high or low compared with recent statistics and so, usually, coincides 
with the peak of a boom or the trough of a bust. In addition, qualitative analysis is provided in 
advance of the quantitative analysis in order to contextualise quantitative descriptors.
Finally, a country level regression model is constructed using the five indices. The financial 
market index is used as a dependent variable, the dynamic corporate governance index as 
predictor variable, and the three control indices as control variables. Both Bayesian and classical 
regression methods have been used in the analysis13. 
III. Historical background of the Chinese stock market 
The Chinese stock market emerged from a unique background. From the outset, it was closely 
related to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform. Like its former socialist counterparts, before 
the 1978 economic reform, SOEs dominated Chinas economy, particularly its industrial sector. 
Further, as was the case with their socialist counterparts, the eve of the economic reform was a 
period characterised by sloth, inefficiency and waste across numerous SOEs. The Chinese 
12 For a discussion of all control variables please contact the authors of this paper.
13 The use of regression analysis has resulted in previous remarkable success in other studies. See: X Xu, &Y  
Wang, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies, 10 China Economic Review 
(1999)  BOCA X Wang, L Xu, et al. State-owned Enterprises Going Public: The case of China, Economics of 
Transition 12 (2004)  ;BO CBA B B Jiang et al., Share Reform and the Performance of Chinas Listed Companies 
19 (2008) China Economic Review 489-501.
For more information regarding the computer codes used in the methodology please contact the authors.
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government adopted a number of measures to improve SOEs performance. However, none were 
successful.14 By the end of 1994, more than 50% of the approximately 110,000 SOEs ran at a 
loss,15 with the state industrys losses reaching a record high of almost RMB 80 billion in 1996.16
Historically, the SOEs raised capital primarily through interest-free budgetary grants. With the 
fall in  central governments revenues in the early 1980s and restructuring of the banking 
sector,17 the government moved towards funding SOEs through bank loans. Nevertheless, since 
the main banks were also state-owned, many of the loans were more akin to grants, with debt 
forgiveness and payment deferrals common place. The persistent loss-making SOEs therefore 
resulted in massive non-performing loans (NPLs) in the banking system. 
Consequently between 2000-2002, China had the largest number of NPLs among major Asian 
countries, measured either as a fraction of total new loans made by all banks or as a fraction of 
GDP in a given year. 18 Lardy was of the opinion, when applying the standard accounting 
criteria, that the whole Chinese banking sector was technically insolvent in the mid-1990s.19 As a 
result, the Chinese government needed to find an alternative fundraising vehicle for SOEs and 
the newly-established stock market was enlisted for this mission.20 
14 For instance, see M Shirley and C Xu, Empirical Evidence of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China, 17 
(1)(2001) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization168-200; N Lardy, Chinas Unfinished Economic 
Revolution, (1998), Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution; D Clarke Corporate Govenance in China: An 
Overview 14(2003)China Economic Review 494-507; X Li  and  KE BrØdsggrd, SOE Reform in China, Past, 
Present and Future31(2) (2013) The Copenhagan Journal of Asian Studies (2); S Tenev and C Zhang , Corporate 
Governance and Enterprise Reform in China (2002) Washington, DC: World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation; Q  Liu Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects and Institutional 
Determinants 52(2) (2006) CESIFO Economic Studies 415-453; D Chen, Corporate Governance, Enforcement and 
Financial Development, the China Experience (2013) Edward Elgar, chapter 2 ;  O Sabbaghi, Corporate 
Governance in China: A Review 16 (1) (2016)Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in 
Society 866-882
15 K Lincoln, Fire When Ready, Far Eastern Economic Review, (1995) Feb 23, 50. 
16  Lardy, n.14   
17 Between 1950 and 1978, Chinas financial system consisted of a single bank - the Peoples Bank of China 
(PBOC), a central government-owned bank under the Ministry of Finance which served as both the central bank and 
a commercial bank. Since 1978 the PBOC departed from the MOF and became a separate entity while four state-
owned banks were established to take over some of its commercial banking businesses. 
18 The Asian banker (2003). 
19  N Lardy (1998) n.14. 
20 J Wu, Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform (2005) Thomson and South-Western. Wu, 
then served as an advisor to the State Council, claimed that the administrative authorities ..adopted the policy that 
the stock market should serve the SOEs.
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Given the primary task of the Chinese stock market is to finance SOEs (which remained true 
until at least very recently), it is no surprise that the stock market is dominated by  state-owned 
companies (directly or indirectly owned).21 A 2003 study showed that approximately 84% of 
listed companies were under state control;22 at the end of January 2013, listed SOEs constituted 
nearly 51.4% of the total market capitalization.23 Moreover, in order to maintain the states 
control over the listed companies, two classes of shares were created, one was tradable and the 
other was non-tradable. Tradable shares were offered to public investors and non-tradable shares 
were owned by either state or legal persons.24 As a consequence, throughout the limited history 
of the Chinese capital market, only around one third of shares were tradable.25
IV. Quantitative assessment of financial market growth in China
21 Jiang et al., n.13; P Wonacott, Chinas Stock Markets Open Doors 10 (2002)Wall Street Journal, September; C 
Walter and F Howie,  (2003) Privatizing China: The Stock Markets and Their Role in Corporate Reform,John 
Wiley and Sons; S Tenev, C Zhang and L Brefort Corporate Governance and Enterprises Reform in China, 
Building the Institutions of Modern Markets  (2002) World Bank Publications; L Tian, State Shareholding and The 
Value of Chinese Firms (2001)Working Paper, London Business School; Q Sun and W Tong China Share Issue 
Privatization: the Extent of Its Success, 70 (2) (2003) Journal of Financial Economics 183-222
22 G Liu and P Sun, Identifying Ultimate controlling shareholders in Chinese public corporations: an empirical 
survey. Asia Program Working Paper No 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3096_stateshareholding.pdf . 
23 A report made by the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), see State-
owned Listed Companies Account for 51.4 Percent of the A-share Market Capitalization, available at  Yicai 
Network:  http:www.yicai.com/news/2013/01/2404678.html, accessed 27 February 2017. 
24 State shares are held by the central and local governments, which are represented by the SOSAC. Legal person is 
defined as a non-individual legal entity or institution, they include stock companies, non-bank financial institutions 
and SOEs that have at least one non-state owner. Non-tradable shares can only be transferred between state and legal 
persons by off-market negotiation.
25 For instance, by the end of 2004, 64 percent of the total 7149 billion shares were non-tradable, among which 74 
percent was state owned. See The CSRC,2008 China Capital Market Development Report(The 2018 Report 
hereinafter) 
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From 1995 to 2005, momentum towards shareholder primacy gained traction culminating in the 
probability of change in the development of the financial market within China being a gradual 
process producing a high probability of change (year 11 probability of 0.99).27 This corresponds 
to the year 2006/07. It is submitted the reduced probability of change thereafter was due to the 
ensuing Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The height of the crisis corresponds with the reduced 
probabilities (years 12-14). One compelling reason for such a reduced probability was the GFC 
unveiled that emphasis on adopting shareholder primacy regulations does not necessarily equate 
to higher financial market growth (as inferred by OECD and World Bank).28 The GFC 
questioned the causal relationship between the ability of shareholder primacy to positively 
impact financial market growth. A report analysing this very point confirmed there are more 
influential ways of nurturing financial market growth.29 
V. Evolution of corporate governance in China 
26 N Samanta, (2015) The impact of adopting shareholder primacy corporate governance on the growth of the 
financial market in developing countries. PhD thesis, University of Sheffield.
27 The 2018 Report, n.25 at p.161.
28 The World Bank (2000), n.1
29 The World Bank(2000), n.1; ; H Hansmann and R Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law 89 (2000) 
Geo. L. J. 439; H Hansen and J Rand, On the causal links between FDI and growth in developing countries 29(1) 
(2006)  The World Economy 21-41.
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Development of corporate governance in China is a process that complemented and supported 
SOE reform.  Until 1978 there were no enterprises in the modern or commercial sense in 
existence throughout China. Traditional SOEs (TSOEs) were essentially a grassroots production 
unit for cost accounting, but had insufficient characteristics that are expected of enterprises. In 
other words, a TSOE therefore had the basic task of carrying out all instructions and directives 
from the state.. 
From 1978 to 1993 the Chinese government adopted a series of measures to boost TSOEs 
performance.  These measures mainly focused on increasing TSOEs operational autonomy and 
creating economic incentives for managers. As a result the state incrementally reduced its direct 
control over production and managers were allowed to retain the profits over and above the fixed 
targets.30 Although these strategies did increase employees incentive to maximize valueat first, 
the positive impact was only short-lived since managers and workers only took the upside of 
profit increasing,had no responsibility in relation to the downside which was still borne by the 
state.31 In addition,  the governments persistent  intervention often gave rise to a clash between 
the government officials and managers,   resulting in enormous inefficiencies.32
In order to separate state ownership from daily control over the SOES, during 1993-2003, the 
policy of corporatisation was introduced. The underlying idea of corporatisation is through 
restructuring SOEs and adopting western-style corporate governance, effectively eliminating 
harmful administrative intervention to daily management while leaving state-ownership intact33.  
The 1993 Company Law legislation was passed in the service of those firms. TSOEs were 
requested to convert into one of the three forms of companies: joint stock company, limited 
liability company or wholly state-owned limited liability company.34  The old organs of 
governance (Party Committee, General Meeting of Employees Representatives and Union) were 
replaced by the shareholders general meeting, board of directors and supervisory board. The 
corporatized SOEs now look very much like their western counterparts, at least in form. In 1998, 
30 Its called the SOE Management Responsibility System. 
31 Shirley and Xu, n.14 .
32  Clarke, n.14  Tenev and Zhang, n.14
33 C Lin, Corporatization and Corporate Governance in Chinas Economic Transition 34 (2001) Economics of 
Planning 5-35;   S Wong, S Opper and  R HU, Shareholding Structure, Depoliticization and Firm Performance12 
(1)(2004)Economics of Transition 29-66;
34 C Wei-qi, and P Lawton, Chapter 3: SOEs reform from a governance perspective and its relationship with the 
privately owned publicly listed corporation in China In D Brown and A MacBean, Challenges for Chinas 
Development: An Enterprise Perspective 2005 UK:Routeledge at 25.
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the first Chinese Securities Law was promulgated  it was the product of a decades work on 
securities and how it could supplement Chinas political context.35
From 1993-2002, the Chinese capital market experienced a period of short term prosperity but 
this was accompanied by corporate scandals and financial crimes. 327 treasury bond scandals 
resulted in the collapse of Wan Guo Securities company (the then largest securities company) 
and the imprisonment of its general manager. The Yin Guangxia scandal was known as Chinas 
Enron, in which the listed company was revealed to have faked almost everything, from 
booking accounts to supply contracts; Lan Tian, Daqing Lianyi were all held to be liable of 
misconduct on a similar scale. It was discerned that listed companies were being treated akin to 
ATMs by their controlling shareholders together with rife presence of so-called tunnelling36. 
As a consequence, issues of corporate governance were brought to the public's attention and 
became a major item on the agenda of the regulator. 
On 31 May 2001 the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), released the Guidelines 
for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies and made 
a mandatory requirement of having at least one-third of independent directors on the board. In 
early 2002 the CSRC and National Economic and Trade Commission jointly issued the Code of 
Corporate Governance of Listed Companies. This Code was based on OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles but also gave particular consideration to the circumstances and 
outstanding issues of listed companies in China.37 It expounded basic principles of corporate 
governance; the means to achieve investor protection; and the basic code of conduct and 
professional ethics that need to be observed by directors, supervisors, managers and other 
executives of listed companies. Consequentially, the number of companies listed on the stock 
exchange from 1993 increased annually.38 
In 2005, both Company Law and Securities Law were revised and passed by the National 
Peoples Congress (NPC). The 2005 Company Law confirmed most of the corporate governance 
35 The 2018 Report, n.25at161.
36 G Jiang, C Lee and H Yue, Tunneling through Inter-corporate Loans: The China Experience, 98(1) (2009) 
Journal of Financial Economics 1-20; Q Liu, Z Lu, Earnings Management To Tunnel: Evidence from Chinas 
Listed Companies(2004) available at  
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b3f2/d296e1acad2806d8c9f6c6b7d3bf36bb01a3.pdf 
37 International Monetary Fund, Peoples Republic of China: Detailed Assessment Report: IOSCO Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation.(2012) US: Washington DC pp.2-5.
38 ibid, pp.166, 180.
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measures already adopted by the CSRC, such as the mandatory requirement of independent 
directors that is now included in Article 123.  It also made further efforts in strengthening 
minority shareholder protection, as represented by the introduction of cumulative voting in the 
election of directors and supervisors;39 it imposed constraints on large shareholders voting in 
related transactions;40 prohibited directors from voting on matters of conflicting interests;41 and 
established a system of private securities litigation (PSL).42 
The 2006 Securities Law improved the system of governing issuance, trading, registration and 
settlement of securities and provided for the establishment of multi-tiered capital-market 
architecture. It enhanced the supervision of listed companies, made issuance approval procedure 
more transparent and established a system of listing sponsorship.43 It advanced minority 
shareholders protection by imposing further constraints on corporate controllers,44 setting up 
investor protection funds45 and extending legal grounds for PSL to insider trading and market 
manipulation.46
Further seismic reforms took place in 2005 in the Split-Share ReformReform (guquan feizhi 
gaige). The reform aimed to resolve the long-standing issue of non-tradable shares. Under the 
new policy the constraint on state and legal person shares was removed and all shares of listed 
companies became fully circulated. Nonetheless, the impact of this change has been prolonged 
and incremental with listed companies requiring compensation packages approved by the holders 
of tradable shares before circulating the non-tradable shares47. By the end of 2009 tradable 
shares still accounted for only 28.4% of the total shares outstanding. 48
39 Art 106.
40 Art 16, Art 125.
41 Art 125.
42 Art 152.
43 Art 11. Also mentioned in the 2018 Report,  n.25.
44 For instance, Art 47, Art 68.
45 Art 134.
46 Art 76, 77.
47 Z Yang, W Hou, X Qian, The Split-Share-Structure Reform in China: Past, Procedure, and Impact In: 
Cumming D., Firth M., Hou W., Lee E. (eds) (2015)Sustainable Entrepreneurship in China. Palgrave Macmillan, 
New York 159-177; A Beltratti and B Bortolotti,  The Nontradable Share Reform in the Chinese Stock Market: 
The Role of Fundamentals(20017), available at 
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/ba00118048a7e555a11fe76060ad5911/Beltratti%252C%2BBortolotti%2B-
%2BThe%2BNontradable.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&ContentCache=NONE;
48 The 2018 Report, n.25.
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Within the framework of the revised Company Law and Securities Law, the CSRC adopted a 
series of measures in relation to corporate governance.49 Those significant regulations include: 
Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies (2007); Guidelines on Articles of 
Association of Listed Companies (2006); Regulations on the Takeover of Listed Companies 
(2006); Regulations on Major Asset Reorganization of Listed Companies (2008); and 
Regulations on Stock Option Incentives of Listed Companies (Trial) (2005).50.
In addition to legislation and regulations, the stock exchanges51 also moved ahead in protecting 
minority shareholders. They built up a market surveillance system that closely monitored the 
share price fluctuation in order to prevent illegal stock manipulation. They suspended companies 
that failed to improve information transparency and took measures to forcibly disclose 
information pertinent to investors interest that public companies chose not to announce. 
Despite technical differences, it is safe to say that the overwhelming majority of the rules 
adopted by the Chinese authorities are consistent with international best practice of corporate 
governance and have a clear shareholder value orientation. Next, we will test whether this 
shareholder value orientation is linked with the growth of Chinas financial market. 
VI. Quantitative assessment of Chinese corporate governance evolution
49 ibid, p.165.
50 The 2018 Report,  n.25, at. 165, 210.
51 Although stock exchanges claim to be self-regulatory bodies, they are, in fact, tightly controlled by the CSRC and 
therefore more like an executive branch of the CSRC.
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52
The probability of change occurring in year 4 (probability of 0.99) and year 11 (probability of 
1.0) is quite high. This corresponds to the year 1998 when Securities Law was adopted53 and the 
years 2005/06 which sits squarely between the amendments to company law in 2005 wherein a 
new Administrative Measures on Securities Depository and Split Share Reform was introduced, 
together with Clearing in 2006 and Provisional Administrative Measures on Transferring Shares 
Owned by State-Owned Shareholders (promulgated by the CSRC and SASAC in 2007).54 The 
data is suggestive of a high probability that China has made improvements to its corporate 
governance which, subsequent to the implementation of the above reforms, are likely to be 
shareholder orientated. 
Thus our quantitative analysis matches up with the qualitative discussion in the previous section.
VII. Impact of changes in corporate governance on Chinese financial market growth
52 N Samanta, (2015) The impact of adopting shareholder primacy corporate governance on the growth of the 
financial market in developing countries. PhD thesis, University of Sheffield.
53 Securities Law of the People's Republic of China < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/11/content_1383569.htm>.
54 The 2018 Report,  n.25.
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The timeline of the above diagram55 corresponds to the time period being analysed, that being 
from 1995 to 2014. It complements the protracted securities reforms within China for that same 
time period. Accordingly, the graphs above show Chinese corporate governance was non-
existent for a period of time (the Chinese corporate governance index starts at -3, one of the 
lowest among the countries studied, followed by aggressive development over a short period of 
time with some rapid bursts followed by a slow tapering off (between 1995 and 2014 China had 
one of the highest degrees of shareholder value shift in the corporate governance model). The 
diagram is supportive of the CSRCs findings that between 1995 to 2006 the emergence of 
capital markets had been borne of reform to Chinese securities which gave primacy to 
shareholders whilst strengthening corporate governance.56 Accordingly, it follows from this that 
incremental reform presence increases the probability of corporate governance prevalence. It is 
no surprise therefore that when the frequency of Chinese securities reform reduced, the corporate 
governance trend plateaued. 
In contrast to other developing countries with planned economies, there are diverse results of the 
progression of corporate governance. For instance in Brazil between 1995 to 2001, there was a 
55 N Samanta, (2015) The impact of adopting shareholder primacy corporate governance on the growth of the 
financial market in developing countries. PhD thesis, University of Sheffield.
56 ibid, pp.13-14.
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non-existent shift to shareholder primacy in corporate governance unlike China.57 Thereafter 
Brazil had slow growth from 2001 to 2010. Similarly, El Salvador replicated these results in the 
same time period. These contrast to other central economies such as Vietnam which had results 
akin to Chinas corporate governance progression.58 It is surprising to witness divergent 
progressions amongst centrally planned developing economies. 
There are several possible explanations for this. Two of those could be time lag and 
demographics. In relation to the former, Chinas and Vietnams plateau circa 2005 may reflect 
the seismic changes posed to complex political ideology and institutions which confined the 
parameters corporate governance operated within. The derogation of power in favour of primary 
shareholders contrasts with political ideology of governance being state owned therefore 
transplantation of OECD and the World Banks suggestions cannot be expected to be 
instantaneous, rather a prolonged process. Coupled with the GFC, which many scholars have 
argued was caused by manipulation of capital asset prices by economic actors having too much 
power59, reinforces resistance for all shares being tradable with Government ownership being 
drastically reduced.60 The political undertones may explain the plateaued period after 2005. 
In relation to demographics, these are a dependent variable which can be influenced by extrinsic 
events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union which could provide an explanation why the 
trend of corporate governance in Asia increased throughout the 1990s analogous to El Salvador 
and South American countries which may not be as politically or economically reactive. 
Accordingly, increased shareholder value corporate governance tends to coincide with higher 
financial market development,61 but the control variables evidence much greater influence on 
financial markets. However, the importance of non-governmental actors in the promotion of 
corporate governance must not be understated. Academic literature is supportive of the above 
diagrams insofar as state promotion of corporate governance is limited due to the governments 
57 See Navajyoti Samanta, A leximetric analysis of evolution of corporate governance regulations in 21 countries. 
XXXX
58 ibid
59 A Berle and G Means, The modern corporation and private property. (1968). ew York: Harcourt, Brace & World 
(Rev. ed.); B Wang, A Study of the current legal situation of the organizational structure of companies limited by 
shares and the legislature program for them (1999) China Reform and Development Institute 135; ; E F Fama, Two 
Pillars of Asset Pricing. 104(6) (2014) American Economic Review 1467; Clarke, n.14
60 Jiang et al., n.13
61 The World Bank (2000), n.1
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finite resources; more active engagement is required by non-government institutions/actors to 
promote corporate governance62..The plateau in the above diagram affirms these sentiments, 
notwithstanding the growing acceptance amongst scholars of non-governmental ownership 
structures positively correlating to improved corporate governance with non-controlling 
shareholders have an important role.63. From a commercial perspective shareholders want 
maximised profits whilst being as risk aversive as possible. It is in their interest to promote 
corporate governance to preclude erosion of certainty and repetition of scandals of the 1990s64 
which could ultimately affect their investments and personal wealth.65 
66
This is proved by the fact that the regression planes have a remarkably high tilt towards the Z 
axis which denotes the control variables. Change in corporate governance has an impact on 
financial market growth comparable with that of financial and technological inclusion (control 2) 
where the regression plane is almost flat, signifying similar importance between the variables in 
the X axis and the Z axis. The other control factors like the economic factors (control 1), increase 
investment in R&D and technology-led exports have far more impact than shifts in the corporate 
governance model. 
62 Jiang et al, n.13
63 Y Kang, B Kim, Ownership structure and firm performance: Evidence from the Chinese corporate reform 23 
(2012) China Economic Review 471.
64 N Rajagopalan, Y Zhang, Corporate governance reforms in China and India: Challenges and Opportunities 51 
(2008) 58-60.
65 La Porta et al., (2005)n.8.
66 N Samanta, (2015) The impact of adopting shareholder primacy corporate governance on the growth of the 
financial market in developing countries. PhD thesis, University of Sheffield.
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While the regression coefficients for control variables are comparable, the corporate governance 
regression coefficients diverge extremely between Bayesian and frequentist analysis. Bayesian 
analysis puts the impact of change in corporate governance at approximately five times that 
given by frequentist analysis.
CG Control 1 Control 2 Control 3 Intercept
Mean Bayesian 0.032681 0.46066 0.24393 0.327721 -0.00826
Frequentist 0.005788 0.460602 0.23133 0.342759 -0.10093
  
Bayesian analysis puts the high density interval tightly between 0.018637 and 0.046816, the 
frequentist coefficient falls well out of this range. However, both coefficients are much smaller 
in comparison to the control coefficients. 
A ratio analysis shows the impact as following and bears out the summary above.
Mean Bayesian Frequentist
CG:Ctrl1 CG:Ctrl3 CG:Ctrl1 CG:Ctrl3
1 : 14.096 1 : 10.028 1 : 79.581 1 : 59.22
Thus it is quite clear that, in comparison to other control factors, the change in corporate 
governance has little correlation to the growth in the financial market in China.
VIII. Explanation to the growth of the Chinese Stock Market: other drivers?
Our quantitative analysis found a weak correlation between Chinas shareholder orientation 
corporate governance reform and the growth of its financial market. This may appear to 
challenge La Portas Law and Finance literature which claims shareholder protection leads to 
capital market development.67 It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a comprehensive, 
detailed explanation to this deviation although this issue has been discussed by one of the authors 
in a previous paper. The main arguments can be summarized as follows: 
67 La Porta et al., (1997)(1998), n.8
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The growth of Chinas capital market is mainly driven by institutional rent-seeking and financial 
repression.68 For any stock market to grow there must be a demand and supply of equity capital.  
However, previous studies have shown that neither can be taken for granted. On the demand 
side, since information asymmetry is most severe in relation to equity financing, equity capital is 
usually the least rather than most favoured financing vehicle.69 On the supply side, the law and 
finance literature has well established that in the absence of strong shareholder protection, 
investors would be reluctant to part with their capital and trust it with corporate controllers.  In 
China, institutional rent-seeking created the demand and financial repression accounted for the 
supply. 
On the demand side, the price of equity capital in Chinese financial markets has been distorted 
and artificially maintained to reflect cheap prices. As mentioned earlier in this article, the 
primary goal of the Chinese stock market is to finance its SOEs. In order to ensure the lions 
share of equity finance flowing into SOEs, the entry of market has been tightly controlled and 
the state regulates almost every aspect of stock issuance from the issuer to the price of IPO. By 
limiting the supply of stocks togetherwith the fact that two thirds of the stocks are non-tradable, 
it significantly lowered the cost of equity capital and turned it into nearly a free lunch for 
issuers.70 In other words, it created enormous rents for issuers to catch. Thus, in China, contrary 
to the corporate finance theory and the practice in mature markets,71 equity financing becomes 
companies most favoured vehicle72 and there has always been a fierce competition for listing.73  
The scale of regulatory rents is estimated to be at 20 percent of total market capitalization.74
68 For a more detailed study, see D Chen, Developing a Stock Market Without Institutions-the China Puzzle, 13 
(2013) Journal of Corporate Law Studies,151-184 
69 S Mayers, The Capital Structure Puzzle (1994) 39(3) Journal of Finance, 575; S Mayers and N Majluf,  
Corporate Financing and Investment Decision When Firms Have Information that Investors Do not Have (1984), 
13(2) Journal of Financial Economic 187. 
70 This is known in Chinas stock market, as quan qian( a free lunch style fundraising). 
71For instance, during 1970s and 1980s, in seven countries (the US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK and Japan), 
the average internal financing constituted 55.71 percent and external financing 44.29 percent , of which equity 
financing was only 10.86%, see R Hubbard, Money, the Financial System and the Economy Addison-Wesley, 2nd 
ed, 1997. 
72 S Huang and G Zhang, Analysis of Chinese Listed Companies Equity Financing Preference 2002 (11), 
Economic Research Journal, 12; C Wan, C Chu, X Li, Y Yuan and J Zhou, A Study on Sources of External 
Financing in Listed Companies, SHSE research paper, available at 
http://static.sse.com/cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/research/plan/plan20020412e.pdf . 
73 It often gives rise to scandals and even crimes. Some senior staff in the CSRC, such as the former vice president 
of the CSRC, Wang Yi was sentenced to death penalty for bribery. 
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On the supply side, the Chinese investors are willing to risk their money in the equity market 
mainly because of the lack of investment alternatives, thanks to the policy of financial 
repression. Financial repression has invariably stood at the centre of Chinas economic policy 
which imposed rigid control over interest rates, the bond market and the convertibility of 
currency. The stock market was the main (if not the only) investment alternative to bank deposits 
before the rise of the property market and the recent development of Fintech. Financial 
repression drives tremendous amount of savings into the stock market regardless of weak 
investors protection.  
In short, Chinas capital market growth is a result of unique institutional arrangement and has 
little to do with changes in corporate governance. 
IX. Conclusion
To conclude, the data portrays the effect of corporate governance regulations on the growth of 
the Chinese financial markets is confined. Controlling for the macroeconomic growth and 
technological growth at least in frequentist or classical method laws have a limited role to play. 
In Bayesian analysis the role of law is more pronounced than in frequentist methods. We would 
thus tend to disagree with the law matters group of legal scholars, at least in the view of this 
empirical research done in the context of Chinese financial market growth.
We aim to add them to a multilevel model later. More focus has to be given on the qualitative 
aspects of Chinese stock exchanges where other considerations apart from the law in books may 
come into play. There are certain market forces like SOEs which need to be studied separately 
from the other listed companies as government stakes may distort the data being analysed. It is 
interesting to note that the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015 has also 
emphasised the regulatory and implementation aspects of corporate governance75. Further studies 
are needed to discern whether China has eagerly adopted the shareholder primacy model 
74 Q Liu, The Shell of Chinese Listed Companies Worth RMB 800 Billion Yuan, 2 June 2002, 21st Century 
Economic Report, available at http://finance.anhunews.com/system/2002/06/02/000027743.shtml;
Also, C Bai, Q Liu and F Song, Bad News is Good News: Propping and Tunnelling Evidence from China, working 
paper (University of Hongkong 2004), available at 
http://www.hiebs.hku.hk/working_paper_updates/pdf/wp1094.pdf.
75 The World Bank (2000), n.1 
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espoused in the 2004 OECD Principles showing a similar propensity towards strengthening the 
regulatory systems as encouraged in the 2015 OECD Principles.76
76 International Monetary Fund, Peoples Republic of China: Detailed Assessment Report: IOSCO Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation. (2012) US: Washington DC; G20/OECD. G20/OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. (2015) OECD: Secretary General of the OECD.
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